movements on the other hand, encouraged autonomy and self-expression, which, in turn, brought women voters closer to left-wing parties. This phenomenon was particularly pronounced among the younger generations, leading Norris to coin the term 'generation gender gap' (Norris, 1996) . Since the 1980's, the electoral boom of populist and anti-immigrant radical right parties, especially in Europe, has brought about a new cleavage, women appearing more reluctant than men to give their votes to these parties. Betz was the first to outline this phenomenon in his seminal study on the radical populist right in Europe (Betz, 1994, pp. 142-148) . The difference seems to persist up to date (Givens, 2004; Norris, 2005; Immerzeel et al, 2015; de Bruijn and Veenbrink, 2012) .
A first line of argument considers the different location of men and women in the labour market (Studlar et al, 1998; Mayer, 2002; Givens, 2004; Rippeyoung, 2007) . Men are over-represented in manual occupations, particularly among blue-collar workers (ouvriers) and it is precisely among the working-class that the European radical right draws the most support (Betz, 1994; Kitschelt and McGann, 1995; Kriesi et al, 2008; Oesch, 2008) . 2 With the lowest levels of education, income and status and the highest rates of unemployment, blue-collar workers appear as the 'globalization losers' by excellence (Betz, 1994; Kriesi et al, 2008; Bornschier and Kriesi, 2012) . In competition with cheap labour in developing countries on the one side and immigrants inside the country on the other side, they should be more receptive to the xenophobic appeals of the radical right. In contrast, women are more often employed in non-manual clerical or services jobs, especially in the public sector. Therefore, they should be in more secure positions and less exposed to the threat of immigration.
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In this perspective the RRGG would boil down to a composition effect (Rippeyoung, 2007, p. 383) .
A second line of research stresses the protective influence of religion. Christian churches all over Europe have repeatedly condemned the anti-immigrant and inegalitarian message of the radical right in the name of the Evangels. The more a person is under the influence of these churches, the less she should be tempted to vote for such parties. Although a process of secularization is taking place in post-industrial European societies, women, especially the elderly, still attend religious services more often than men do. 4 Women should therefore be more likely to hear the warnings of the Church. Sineau has showed that in the case of France not only women are more often regular practicing Catholics, but more receptive to the Catholic message. At similar level of religious practice than men, they were in the Presidential election of 2002 far more inclined to reject Jean-Marie Le Pen and his ideas. And this gap reached a record among elderly women, Catholic and regular church-goers (Sineau, 2004, p. 220) .
A third block of research puts forward the gradual diffusion of feminist ideas at all levels of society (Inglehart and Norris, 2003) . This diffusion could prevent women, especially in the younger generations, to support far-right parties, which defend a very traditional ideology, and reducing them to their role of spouse and mothers.
Conversely, the very spread of feminist ideas, the claims for equality, the growing presence of women in the workforce could be seen as a threat for masculine supremacy, breeding insecurity and resentment, and feeding an authoritarian antifeminist backlash in favour of the far right (Perrineau, 1997) . This should apply all the more in working-class milieus, where norms of strong manhood and masculinity, based on physical strength, still predominate (Molinier, 2004; Frader, 2008) .
Another explanation for the gender gap in radical right voting focuses on the unequal relationship between men and women in politics. For long relegated in the private sphere, women are latecomers on the electoral scene, 5 especially in France where they got the right to vote one century after men. On the whole, they still pay less interest to politics, and get lower grades on political knowledge scales (Chiche and Haegel, 2002) , even when controlling for age, education and social status. They would therefore be more prone to support the mainstream and long established parties than newcomers and outsiders like the radical rights (Immerzeel et al, 2015) .
A last line of research insists on the persistence of gender stereotypes learned from early socialization (Huddy and Terkildsen, 1993; Lahire, 2001; Mossuz-Lavau, 2014) . Girls are still trained differently than boys, expected to be less aggressive and not violent. Women in surveys still more often reject the idea of war and conflict than men. 6 The image of virility and violence associated to radical right parties could explain their greater reluctance to support them. In France, for instance, Jean-Marie Le Pen has made it a habit to spice up his speeches with verbal violence and sexist undertones (Alduy and Wahnich, 2015, p. 54) . Moreover, he even physically assaulted the female socialist mayor of Mantes La Jolie, Annette Peulvast-Bergeal, during the campaign for the 1997 parliamentary elections. Women also appear more sensitive than men to social norms and cues. A study based on three waves of the CSES (Comparative Study of Electoral Systems) in 32 countries shows that men are politically more 'assertive'. For instance, they are systematically more likely to vote for stigmatised parties than women (Harteveld et al, 2013, p. 12) .
Despite all these explanations, the debate on the magnitude of the gender gap in radical right voting is still open (for example, the results differ widely from one country to another and from one election to another). 7 This applies even more so, given that the above-mentioned studies do not attempt a systematic exploration of the RRGG. The earlier ones just acknowledge the gap, on the base of simple cross tabulations comparing the level of electoral support of these parties by gender and by country, sometimes only at one point of time, not controlling for the possible effect of other variables. When they do attempt to include systematic controls (for instance Norris, 2005; Rippeyoung, 2007; Immerzeel et al, 2015) , it is usually on the base of large cross-national surveys (European Values Study, European Social Survey, World Values Survey). However, we should keep in mind that these surveys are not electoral surveys. When they ask for voting intentions or past votes, it is out of context, sometimes months away from the election itself, with the risk of giving a distorted image of the respondent's electoral behaviour. And the country subsamples are usually small, giving in the end very small numbers of declared far right voters, (this trend is further reduced by the fact that moral reprobation is still attached to many of these parties). Even in specifically comparative electoral surveys like the EES (European Election Studies), the number of self-declared radical right voters is sometimes too small to allow for any serious statistical analysis. For instance they were only 58 declared FN voters in the 2014 wave, amounting to 16 per cent of the declared votes (instead of the real 25 per cent). Even if we switch to PTVs (Propensity to vote), these surveys offer a good proxy but not perfect equivalence to real votes (Barisione and Mayer, 2015) .
The Turning Point of the 2012 French Presidential Election
Taking the existence of a RRGG for granted, it is with this literature in mind that I started working on the votes for the FN in the 2012 presidential election. The French context lends itself well to the study of the evolution of the RRGG. In line with most surveys at the time, our 2012 survey showed practically no difference in the electoral support of men and women for Marine Le Pen (−1.5 percentage points) ( Table 1 ). The only noticeable gender gap was observed in the level of support for the incumbent President, Nicolas Sarkozy, whose score was 6 percentage points higher among women. While conversely women gave less votes to the Left (extreme left, Green and socialist candidates all together drew 41 per cent of their votes from women compared with 45.5 among men).
However a simple cross tabulation is not conclusive to make causal claims. To evaluate the specific impact of gender it is necessary to control for the effects of other sociodemographic and attitudinal variables likely to influence support for the FN. When Jean-Marie Le Pen chaired the FN, gender was the second-best predictor of his electoral support, after education, in every presidential election where he was candidate from 1988 to 2007 (Mayer, 2002, p. 220) .
9 I expected to find more or less the same pattern for his daughter in 2012, just attenuated. But all three different sets of data I checked showed, all things being equal, that there was practically no more difference between the level of support of men and women for the candidate of the FN. practice (Model 2), then adding location on the left-right scale (Model 3) and finally the score of sympathy for Marine Le Pen (Model 4), the results are very clear (Tables 2 and 3 ). In 2002, there was a statistically significant impact of gender, at all steps of the model. Women voted less than men for Jean-Marie le Pen in the first round of the 2002 election, whatever their age, their level of education, their occupational group, their political orientation and their sympathy for the leader of the FN. In the first round of the 2012 Presidential Election, contrary to our expectations, it was exactly the opposite: gender had no impact whatsoever, either alone (Model 1) or controlling for the same sociodemographic (Model 2) or attitudinal variables (Models 3 and 4) than in 2002. Hence it is important to explain the disappearance of the RRGG.
Explaining the Closure of the RRGG
Our hypothesis is that the very factors that accounted for the emergence of the RRGG are less relevant today, because of changes on the supply side as well as on the demand side of French electoral politics, in a context of economic crisis and political disaffection.
Women are under-represented in manual occupations. According to French Census data, they count for less than 20 per cent of the manual blue-collar class (ouvriers) versus almost three quarters of the routine non-manual group (employés) (Guggemos and Vidalenc, 2014) . But in both groups, women are over-represented in unskilled jobs, accounting for one-third of the unskilled blue collars and some 80 per cent of the unskilled employees. And if, in the aftermath of the 2008 recession, unemployment first hit men more than women, the latter are more often underemployed (Guedj, 2013) , in non-wanted part-time and temporary positions. Thirty per cent of the working women (versus 6 per cent of working men) hold part-time jobs and the proportion is above 40 per cent among women without any degree, especially in the service sector.
11 Precariousness hits these women as much as, if not more than, male industrial blue-collar workers. Recent research on the dualization of the labour market in post-industrial societies confirms a growing divide between 'insiders' and 'outsiders' and the over-representation of women, as well as young people and immigrants, among the latter (Milewski et al, 2011; Haüsermann and Schwander, 2012) . The deteriorating economic situation of women, especially in the service proletariat, 12 could fuel their support for the far right in 2012 and contribute to a reduction of the RRGG.
Women are still more religious than men and more integrated into the Catholic Community, the dominant religious group in France. And the Catholic Church repeatedly condemned the ideas of the FN. But the relationship of Catholics with immigrants and more specifically Islam is changing since 1990, as shown by the annual survey on racism, anti-Semitism and xenophobia conducted for the National In the survey conducted after these events, for the first time, all things being equal, Catholics were more ethnocentric than non-Catholics and their intolerance rose with the level of religious practice (Mayer and Michelat, 2007) . The greater visibility of Islam in the public space (street prayers, headscarves, burqas) and the polarization of the political debate on the issues of immigration and national identity is bringing Catholics to assert more than before their own religious identity as different from Muslim identity, if not superior. Following reports confirmed the trend (see also Michelat and Dargent, 2015) , although less pronounced once the emotional reaction to the 2005 Cartoons affair declined. 13 Nevertheless, fear of Islam and of immigration could counterbalance the tolerant message of the Evangels, among men and women alike.
Since the May 68 social movement, feminist and sexually permissive values have diffused in society, 14 making repulsive for many women, especially young and active ones, the traditional image of women as mothers and housewives defended by the FN at the time of Jean-Marie Le Pen. However, this traditional image of women should be less pronounced after his daughter has taken the reigns of the FN. Marine Le Pen is a woman, and she offers a 'modernized-traditional' image of women (Amesberger and Halbmayr, 2002, pp. 17-26; Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2015, pp. 11-13) , which is open to women's economic independence and their rights to a professional career. Marine Le Pen never misses an opportunity to remind her audience that she is a working woman, twice divorced, taking care of three children and living 'out of wedlock' with her present companion (Alduy and Wahnich, 2015, pp. 53-54) . 15 She also appears more open on moral issues, saying she understands women who abort, even if she criticizes 'comfort abortion'. She is also taking the defence of women and gays against the intolerance of some Muslims: 'Nowadays, in certain neighbourhoods, it's not easy to be a woman, or homosexual, or Jew, or even French or white' (meeting in Lyon, 10 December 2010). Finally, the strategy of normalization (dédiabolisation) implemented by Marine Le Pen after she took over the party, in January 2011, is progressing. The FN's ideas look less extreme, as shown by the annual Barometer on the image of the NF (www .tns-sofres.com/sites/default/files/2015.02.16-baro-fn.pdf). The proportion of the population seeing her party as a 'danger for democracy', was way above 65 per cent for decades. Yet, this number dropped to 47 per cent in January 2012. If in the same barometer the FN is still located more to the right than all parties on the left-right scale, the proportion of the sample seeing it as 'a patriot right defending traditional values' is equal to the proportion seeing it a as ' xenophobic extreme right'. Contrary to her father, Marine Le Pen does not cross the red line of anti-Semitism, saying repeatedly that the Holocaust was 'the summit of human barbarism'. Even the immigration issue is framed in a more subtle way, presenting the FN as a champion of democracy, fighting Islam portrayed as a threat for freedom and for the rights of women, gays and Jews as seen above. 16 As a result, opinion polls show that she has become far more popular than her father ever was (Mayer and Tiberj, 2015, pp. 28-29) . All this could make it less difficult, less morally reprehensible and socially stigmatizing to vote for her, especially for women.
Four lines of explanation can thus be outlined to explain the reduction of the French RRGG:
Hypothesis 1 The deteriorating economic situation, exposing white-collar women in service jobs as much as blue-collar working class men to unemployment and low paid insecure jobs. Hypothesis 2 Religion in a context of rising anti-Islam intolerance protects less than before against far right anti-immigrant ideas.
Hypothesis 3 As leader of the FN, Marine Le Pen appears more women-friendly than her father.
Hypothesis 4 Her strategy of normalization makes the party look less extreme, and more socially acceptable.
A comparison of the regression models for 2002 and 2012 indicates that the first hypothesis (H1) has some ground. In 2002, once controlled by sociodemographic and political variables, occupation has no significant impact on support patterns for Jean-Marie Le Pen. Education at the time is more important than class (Table 2 ). In 2012, and similar to all radical right-wing parties at the time, education still has a strong effect in explaining votes for Marine Le Pen, (Bornschier and Kriesi, 2012) , but occupation has become a significant predictor, even when controlling by sociodemographic characteristics and left-right orientation (Table 3 ). The occupational variable, it should be noted, is operationalized in a different way than in most surveys. Instead of excluding the non-gainfully employed-retired, unemployed or temporarily non-working respondents, these groups are classified according to the last occupation they held, according to the idea that they were socialised in their previous job. On the base of the Census Bureau occupational classification (INSEE), it is possible to separate two groups of routine non-manual employees, office clerks, and sales and services employees. Model 2 (controlling for age and education and religious practice) and Model 3 (adding position on left-right scale) show that compared with the upper class taken as reference category (higher-grade managers and administrators, professionals), belonging to the sales and services employees group (predominantly female, or to the blue-collar workers group (mostly male), significantly increases the probability to vote for Marine le Pen, with coefficients even higher for the first white-collar group. There is also a significant, although lower, probability to vote FN in the group of respondents who never worked, mostly elderly women. 17 The second hypothesis (H2) is that integration in the Catholic Community does not protect as much as before from the attraction by the radical right, among women as well as men. This is not confirmed. Our variable combines religious denomination (Catholic, other religion and no religion) and religious practice (for Catholics only, still the dominant religion in France). In 2002, regular church-goers are not less inclined to support Le Pen. But after controlling for left-right orientation, in order to isolate the specific effect of religion, and for sympathy for the leader of the FN, there is a significant impact of religion. Regular church-goers, men and women, are less inclined to support the far right. In 2012 the picture is slightly different. Once controlled for left-right orientation, Catholic integration has the same protective role than in 2002. But even more important is the protective effect of belonging to the group 'other religions', in which today Muslims are the majority. In 2012, Muslim respondents tend to declare their faith in surveys far more than in 2002, in a society where religious identities are more easily expressed. And it is quite natural they would turn against Marine Le Pen who has made of Islam her main target.
Our last two hypotheses test, in different ways, a 'Marine Le Pen effect'. The first indicator is a scale of expressed sympathy for her ranging between 0 (strongly dislike) and 10 (strongly like). As expected, this scale is by far the best predictor of votes for Marine Le Pen (Table 3) , surpassing the effect of all other variables except one. Her personality, all things being equal, seems to have even more impact than her father's. For in 2002, when he ran as candidate, education, religious practice and left-right orientation still had an impact, after controlling for sympathy for him ( Table 2 ). The second more specific asset of Marine Le Pen is to appear less adverse to mainstream feminist equalitarian values, to project a less traditionalist image than her father. To check this hypothesis, I constructed a scale of cultural liberalism, combining opinions about the traditional role of women as mothers, as well as attitudes towards the right of gays and lesbians to adopt children (this was quite an issue in the 2012 election, as gay marriage was a proposal in the socialist programme). Whether I test it alone, or controlling for all the variables previously used, sociodemographic, religious, political and attitudinal (adding ethnocentrism and euro-scepticism), cultural liberalism has no significant impact on votes for Marine le Pen (Table 4) . Feminism is not the issue that matters when comes the time to vote.
To get a better grasp of gender differences in support for the radical right, I ran the last regression (Model 4) separately for men and women (Table 4) . In both populations, unsurprisingly, sympathy for Marine Le Pen conditions the votes in her favour. But the impact of political orientation and attitudes towards the European Union is different. The position on the left-right scale is just at the limit of significance for men (0.054 for men versus 0.669 for women), signalling a more ideological dimension to their vote choice, something that disappears entirely in the female population. For women, rejection of European integration is the primary motivation of their support for Marine Le Pen. They see the EU as a threat not only to the French national identity but also to the level of social protection in their country. The following figures show how gender interacts with these different attitudes (Figures 2-5) .
For men and women, it is the same attitudes that increase the probability to support Marine Le Pen: a far right location on the left-right scale, a high level of ethnocentrism, a strong rejection of the European Union and a warm sympathy for Marine Le Pen. But these variables do not have the same impact in both populations. A strong RRGG (11 percentage points) persists among the voters who are the most intolerant towards immigrants and foreigners ( Figure 5 ). An even larger gap (28 percentage points) exists among the far-right respondents, located in the extreme position of the left-right scale (Figure 2) . In that extreme group, only half of the women voted for Marine Le Pen (versus practically 80 per cent of the men). In spite of their affinity with the radical right and its ideas, half of the women did not dare go as far as voting for its candidate. But when a strong anti-UE sentiment is expressed, and even more so when a high level of sympathy for Marine Le Pen exists (indicated by a score 10 on the scale), the RRGG not only disappears, it reverses itself (Figures 3-4) . It looks as if the personality of the new FN's leader made the difference, and helped some women take the plunge. The apparent closing of the RRGG in 2012 France is the result of these contrasted trends.
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A Temporary or a Lasting Trend?
The 2014 survey on the European elections offers the opportunity to check the disappearance of the gender gap in a far less mobilizing mid-term election context. Unfortunately, it allows for only a partial replication of the 2012 models, for it does not use the same occupational classification as the 2012 survey, it does not ask about the previous occupation of people out of work, there is no indicator of sympathy for Marine Le Pen, and so on. Therefore, I reduced the regression model to five variables (Table 5) Therefore, it is premature to conclude that the RRGG is definitely closed in France. The process is not stabilized. 19 Voting behaviour depends heavily on the electoral context and the political supply side. The 2014 European elections mobilized less than half of the French electorate (42 per cent), and it seems that this time women went even less often than men to the polls. The issue of turnout was probed at length in the 2014 European Election Survey. Sixty-one per cent of the women (versus 69 per cent of men) chose the first answer: 'I'm sure I voted in the European elections'. Conversely, adding the answers 'I did not vote', 'I thought about voting but didn't', 'I usually vote but didn't this time' and refusal to answer, the proportion of citizens that did not express a vote rose from 31 per cent among men to 39 among women. This could in itself explain the return of the RRGG if part of the young, unskilled women in insecure jobs who turned to Marine Le Pen in higher number in 2012 were not mobilized enough to vote in 2014. The real test will be the 2017 Presidential Election.
Conclusion
The present analysis shows that the RRGG is context dependent, sensitive to social and political change, as well as not written in marble once and for all. Nevertheless, I find that women do not appear so different from men in their support for the French Radical Right. Their votes for the Radical Right in 2012 are explained by the same factors: intolerance to immigrants, euro-scepticism, right-wing positioning, low education and economic insecurity. It just seems, all things being equal, that women are politically less 'assertive' (Harteveld et al (2013) . But in the politicized and mobilizing context of the 2012 Presidential Election, the first post-recession election, dominated by the rejection of Sarkozy, 'president of the rich', Marine le Pen made the difference. This shows women represent a large potential reservoir of support for her and her party that could still increase her electoral base in the future. To go further though, as I started doing in a comparative study of the 2014 European elections (Barisione and Mayer, 2015) , it is necessary to go beyond the fixation on the 'Radical Right Gender Gap' and take into account the heterogeneity of the female electorate. The votes of some women -the elderly, the church-goerscan still be explained by the 'traditional' gender gap. Even if they approve of the FN's ideas about immigration and locate themselves on the far right, they will prefer voting for old established right-wing parties. Others -young, educated, culturally liberal -will turn to the left even more than their male counterparts, along the lines of the 'modern' gender gap. To get the whole picture it is necessary to articulate the three gender gaps in the plural and see how they appear, disappear or overlap.
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Notes 1 I refer in this article to the definition of the Populist Radical Right given by Mudde, based on nativism, authoritarianism and populism (Mudde, 2007, p. 19) . 2 'Ouvriers' are skilled and unskilled manual workers, not only in manufacturing and production but also in transportation, construction, services and crafts, as defined by the French Census Office, Group 6 Europe that men 'never' attend any religious service is 8 per cent, while the predicted probabilities that women 'attend very often'is 6 per cent (François and Magni-Berton, 2014, p. 178) . 5 Women were given voting rights long after men in most countries, especially in France where it took almost a century: men gained universal franchise in 1848, women in 1947. 6 For an interesting approach of the contrasted reaction of women to the use of torture in the post 9/11 context, because of the conflicting impact of feminism and motherhood see Wemlinger, 2013 . 7 For a recent assessment see the 2015 special issue of Patterns of Prejudice on 'Gender and Populist radical Rights Politics' and more specifically the two contributions on the electoral RRGG (Harteveld et al, 2015; . 8 In 2012, the difference was 2.5 percentage points (N = 266) and 1,9 per cent (N = 500) in 2014. In both cases the numbers allow for detailed statistical analyses. 9 Drawing from the data of the 1988 and 1995 Presidential Elections Surveys and the 1997 Parliamentary Elections Survey, a series of logistic regression taking the vote for Le Pen as the dependant variable, showed a robust gender effect throughout the period, during which Le Pen's party reached an electoral threshold of around 15 per cent of the valid vote whatever the type of election, before the split of 1998-1999. The first model controled the effect of gender, age, education, number of links with the working class (being working class, having a father and /or a spouse-working class) and religion
